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Abstract 
As losses from extreme weather events grow, many governments are looking to privatise the 
financing and incentivisation of climate adaptation through insurance markets. In a pure market 
approach to insurance for extreme weather events, individuals become responsible for ensuring 
they are adequately covered for risks to their own properties, and governments no longer contribute 
funds to post-disaster recovery. Theoretically, insurance premiums signal the level of risk faced by 
each household, and incentivise homeowners to invest in adaptive action, such as retrofitting, or 
drainage work, to reduce premiums. Where risk is considered too high by insurance markets, 
housing is devalued, in theory leading to retreat from risky areas. In this paper we evaluate the 
suitability of private insurance as a mechanism for climate adaptation at a household and 
community level. We find a mismatch between social understandings of responsibility for climate 
risks, and the technocratic, market-based home insurance products offered by private insurance 
markets. We suggest that by constructing increasingly individualised, technical and calculative 
evaluations of risk, market-based models of insurance for extreme weather events erode the 
solidaristic and collective discourses and practices that support adaptive behaviour.  
Keywords: insurance, climate change, disaster, adaptation, social legitimacy, extreme weather. 
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Graphical/Visual Abstract and Caption 
 
Home insurance premiums based on individual risk are meant to incentivise adaptation, but can 
undermine collective efforts to adapt to climate change. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
In market-based economies, private home insurance is becoming increasingly normalised as a 
market-based mechanism to enable and incentivise individual adaptation to climate change (Booth 
& Tranter, 2017; King et al., 2013; Porrini & Schwarze, 2014). This can be seen, for example, in policy 
preferences for private, autonomous adaptation expressed by the Council of Australian 
Governments (McDonald, 2014), shifts in the rhetoric of UK governments from managing 
floodwaters to managing the behaviour of individuals at risk (Butler & Pidgeon, 2011), and a focus 
on private insurance as a climate adaptation strategy endorsed by the EU (European Commission, 
2018). Proponents argue that private insurance premiums send a price signal reflecting an objective 
measurement of risk to households, and thus incentivise individual risk management. Governments, 
in turn, see this as a way of reducing the burden on taxpayers of the rising cost of disasters caused 
by extreme weather events (e.g. European Commission, 2018; National Working Group on Financial 
Risk of Flooding, 2019; Productivity Commission, 2014; Surminski, 2018). However, some scholars 
argue that home insurance is inherently maladaptive; that it systemically seeks to restore, rather 
than transform the status quo, and is not fit-for-purpose in an age of rapid climatic change (O’Hare 
et al., 2016; Wamsler & Lawson, 2011).  
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The insurance sector is also instrumental in the shift to a market approach to adaptation. Large 
reinsurers, such as Munich Re, represent themselves in a pseudo-governmental role in relation to 
climate risk – as proactive in the face of government inaction, as a repository for natural disaster 
data, innovator of risk and climate solutions, and on the front foot with regards to climate mitigation 
(Lehtonen, 2017). Insurers also partner with the United Nations, governments and non-government 
organisations in developing and distributing new insurance products, for example, micro-insurance 
to subsistence farmers in the Global South (Johnson, 2013) and public flood insurance schemes in 
the United Kingdom and the United States (McAneney et al., 2016).  
In this paper, our aim is to review the literature pertaining to the role of private insurance in climate 
adaptation, and critically discuss the adequacy of insurance in achieving adaptation outcomes. We 
begin by describing how market approaches to extreme weather disasters are becoming mobilised 
as a mechanism for climate adaptation, as can be seen in the case of Australia. We then describe 
how this disrupts and re-constitutes existing discourses of responsibility, risk and equitability in 
relation to adaptation. In critically evaluating the argument for pure market approaches to climate 
adaptation, we find a mismatch between social understandings of responsibility for climate risks, 
and the technocratic, market-based products offered by private insurance markets. We suggest that 
by constructing increasingly individualised, technical and calculative evaluations of risk, market-
based models of insurance for extreme weather events undermine the solidaristic and collective 
discourses and practices that support adaptive behaviour.  
Underpinning our critical review and subsequent discussion, is a relational theorisation in which co-
constitution and embedded power dynamics are foregrounded. For example, we understand 
extreme weather events such as floods, storms and wildfires as complexly constituted through social 
discourses and practices, rather than as purely ‘natural’ disasters (Stott et al., 2016). These events 
are, in part, a product of carbon emissions by fossil fuel corporations and associated industries, 
population increases and wealth accumulation in areas prone to disasters, lack of government action 
and regulation regarding climate risks, and/or consumption of climate unfriendly products and 
services. Such drivers could be seen as contributing to a collective issue, and thus a collective 
responsibility. However, the shift towards individualisation and privatisation of risk in market-based 
economies means that responsibility for climate-exacerbated events is now highly contested (Adger 
et al., 2013). Adaptation approaches – as we foreground in this paper – reflect the interdependent 
co-constituting relationships between individuals and institutions such as governments and insurers 
that are central to ensuring effectiveness and equitability (Adger, 2003). Thus, in this paper, we are 
careful not to assume linear causal relationships in relation to decision-making, risk, responsibility 
and the adequacy of insurance.  
2. MARKET APPROACHES TO INSURANCE AND DISASTERS 
Before the twentieth century, western societies did not have an institutionalised mechanism for 
dealing with damaging events where no individual was clearly to blame (Ewald, 1991). The logic of 
the twentieth century welfare state drew on the realisation that events such as traffic or factory 
accidents, while individually unexpected, can be anticipated in terms of probability statistics (Ewald, 
1991). These accidents were seen as inevitable results of activities undertaken for the good of 
society, and thus as a collective responsibility. As Lehtonen and Liukko (2011, p. 37) observe, 
damaging events were “seen to be due to the functioning of society as a whole and the relations 
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between people, not to single intentional or careless acts.” In the welfare state, individuals’ rights 
included protection by governments from the consequences of damaging events. Since the late 
twentieth century, the welfare state has been incrementally replaced by forms of governmentality in 
which risks are borne individually, rather than collectively (Maurer, 1999).  
Giddens (1990, 1991) and Beck (1992) see the privatisation of risk as not just a symptom of modern 
life but a method of systemic individualisation, ‘disembedding’ individuals from the certainty of 
membership of collectives such as churches, political parties, industries and nation states (Giddens, 
1990). Through ‘the ideology of privatization’ (Bauman, 2008) collective forms of action are 
condemned for undermining individual freedom of choice. Responsibility for global and collective 
risks such as climate change have thus become individualised through discourses of consumption, 
while the structures of social, corporate and political institutions simultaneously limit the power of 
individuals to address such risks (Norgaard, 2017; Shove, 2010). In this reading of neoliberal 
governmentality, the state is now a system “that calculates and then disburses not the national 
product but the national risk across the population in order to defer capitalist crises, and also in 
order to regulate populations” (Maurer, 1999, pp. 384–385). Reliance on the private sector for 
climate adaptation can thus be seen as neoliberal shift toward individualisation of risk, or 
responsibilisation through which collective social problems are reframed as the product of individual 
choices (Box et al., 2016; McLennan & Handmer, 2012). 
 ‘Pure’ market approaches to insurance for extreme weather events aim to eliminate the need for 
governments to provide financial support either in underwriting private insurance, as insurer of last 
resort, or through post-disaster payments. The Geneva Association, an insurance industry-backed 
economic research association, argue that: 
Traditional post-disaster financial assistance is proving ineffective and insufficient, dis-incentivising 
people, businesses and local governments from taking proactive action to manage their risks. 
Increasingly, governments are recognising the role and benefits of a market-based insurance industry 
in carrying and transferring risk. (Geneva Association, 2018, p. 7).  
Writing for the European Investment Bank, Konrad and Thum (2012, p. 18) argue that there is no 
need for government intervention in private insurance markets:  
Even the observation that insurance is not available in some cases or that insurance premiums are not 
affordable for some customers is not necessarily a sign of market failure… Any attempt to reduce 
insurance premiums through government intervention can distort the allocative role of insurance 
markets. 
An Australian Government inquiry into the cost of natural disasters (Productivity Commission, 2014, 
p. 414), similarly argued that “Governments should not address affordability concerns by providing 
subsidies, especially to high-risk households. Subsidies reduce the effectiveness of insurance in 
communicating and managing risk.”  
In traditional models of insurance, policies ‘mutualised’ or distributed the cost of high-risk properties 
among the wider pool of lower-risk insured households, in order to keep insurance affordable, and 
encourage greater uptake. However, insurers are moving away from this model, as according to 
free-market logic, “high premiums may simply reflect high risks and, therefore, will be useful market 
signals” (Konrad & Thum, 2012, p. 18). Using ‘risk-reflective’ pricing  (also known as risk-based, risk-
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rated, or actuarial pricing) premiums are calculated on the basis of specific and localised risk 
scenarios, which are supported by hazard mapping and assessment of infrastructure and the nature 
of the home. Proponents of market-based private insurance argue the incentive of lower premiums 
encourages risk mitigation and adaptive action, and also limits development in high risk areas (Ben-
Shahar & Logue, 2015). Calculating risk individually is seen as economically more efficient for 
insurers than mutualisation of premiums, as it avoids ‘adverse selection’: attracting more high-risk 
customers, and deterring lower-risk customers (Rees & Wambach, 2008). Because it creates price 
differences between high and low risk households,risk-reflective pricing is believed to incentivise 
adaptive behaviour to reduce risk (Harwood et al., 2016; Hudson et al., 2016). Premiums should be 
unsubsidised by governments, whose funds will then be freed up for adaptation of essential 
infrastructure (National Working Group on Financial Risk of Flooding, 2019). Individuals’ willingness 
to pay high premiums should not be undermined by the possibility of taxpayer funded post-disaster 
pay-outs (Roche et al., 2010).  
As an example, Australia has the closest to what could be called a ‘pure’ market approach to 
insurance for extreme weather events (Christophers, 2019). Australia has historically faced a high 
level of extreme weather disaster events, which are growing in frequency and intensity due to 
climate change (Steffen et al., 2019). Unlike countries such as France or Spain, there is no 
government guaranteed, mutualised catastrophe insurance. Neither does Australia have 
government-subsidised insurance programs for flood such as those in the US and UK. Private 
insurance for storm damage and bushfire is widely available through standard home insurance 
policies. Flood is often included as an option attracting extra cost. There is currently no cover for the 
effects of erosion from sea level rise (Banhalmi-Zakar et al., 2016). Following disasters, the Australian 
Government often provides one-off payments to those affected, largely because of shortfalls in 
private insurance (Institute of Actuaries of Australia, 2011). In times of disaster, it is politically 
expedient to be seen to help those in need. This is against the advice of advocates of the pure 
market approach, who see this as distorting the market by undermining people’s willingness to 
purchase insurance (Geneva Association, 2018). However, as the Insurance Council of Australia 
(2014, p. 4) notes, government payments offered are insufficient to restore such losses, and so do 
little to distort markets. Neither do insurance payments fund adaptive action at a household level 
through upgrading housing: this is often challenged by insurers, as it contradicts the common 
insurance principle of ‘no betterment’. This means that no property improvement should be gained 
by the insured: the nature of the insurance transaction is to reinstate property to its original 
condition, rather than upgrading it (de Vet et al., 2019; O’Hare et al., 2016). Insurers are starting to 
engage with the potential benefits of adaptive retrofitting, and there is opportunity for insurers to 
reduce premiums where risk is reduced by proactive adaptation, but this is not yet widely practiced 
(CRO Forum, 2019). Rather, adherence to the no betterment principle is still a common complaint 
made by Australian households recovering from disaster (de Vet et al., 2019). 
A number of flood, cyclone and bushfire disasters in which large numbers of householders have 
been the victims of inadequate insurance cover have prompted calls for government intervention in 
insurance markets. This occurred in 1974, following floods in Brisbane, after which the government 
of the time gave provisional support to a National Disaster Insurance Scheme in which the federal 
government would provide reinsurance to a private insurance pool (Mason, 2011). In 2011, after 
extensive flooding in south eastern Australia, a Natural Disaster Insurance Review also 
recommended mandatory flood insurance, with discounted premiums for flood insurance for people 
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in medium to high risk areas, supported by a government reinsurance scheme (Trowbridge et al., 
2011). In 2015, a Federal Treasury Taskforce into escalating insurance premiums in Northern 
Australia investigated options for government-backed mutualisation or reinsurance funds for 
cyclone risk. In 2017, the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission began a further inquiry 
into rapid premium increases for cyclone risk in Northern Australia. They found that insurers are 
deliberately raising premiums to discourage customers in high risk areas (Australian Competition and 
Consumer Commission, 2019). This inquiry is currently investigating, once again, options for 
government-sponsored reinsurance pools. However, these kinds of approaches have been invariably 
resisted or rejected in favour of pure market approaches (e.g. Mason, 2011; Tooth, 2012; Australian 
Government, 2015)i.  
According to the Federal Treasury, successive governments have concluded that a “clear market 
failure” such as “where insurance is not being offered because insurers cannot price appropriately or 
where consumers are unable to access insurance for an affordable price” would be necessary for 
government intervention in the form of subsidy or reinsurance (Australian Government The 
Treasury, 2018, p. 4). However, the experience of many Australians – and the evidence of multiple 
public inquiries – attests to both of these conditions being met. Despite insurers’ unfettered ability 
to set prices which, in theory, should avoid adverse selection of too many high risk compared to low 
risk policies, some areas have been described as effectively uninsurable (Australian Government, 
2015). Insurance products available to Australians are highly variable and the extent to which risks 
are covered is most often opaque to insurance customers (Bell, 2011; Fels & Cousins, 2019). Risk-
reflective pricing is practiced by Australian insurers, but a lack of information about how premiums 
are calculated means that in practice they are poor signals of changes in risk. Despite pressure from 
consumer watchdogs, insurers have expressed reluctance to disclose how premiums are calculated 
to their customers (Australian Competition and Consumer Commission, 2019).  
These observations regarding ‘pure’ market approaches also resonate with the role of insurance in 
climate adaptation in Australia. The New South Wales Insurance Monitors (Fels & Cousins, 2019) 
report that significant investments by insurance customers in mitigating risks of storms, floods or 
fires does not commensurately reduce their insurance premiums. In other words, risk-reflexive 
pricing is not acting as an incentive for adaptation in the Australian context, and disadvantaged 
communities are being priced out of protection against climate-related disasters. The Australian 
insurance industry is highly critical of a lack of alternative funding arrangements for climate 
adaptation and mitigation, which increases insurers’ level of risk. A Productivity Commission Inquiry 
into Natural Disaster Funding Arrangements (2014) recommended significant government 
investment into adaptation, but this was rejected by the then Federal government. Currently, 97 per 
cent of federal disaster funding is used to recovery, and only 3 per cent in adaptation (Insurance 
Council of Australia, 2019).  
3. RESPONSIBILITY FOR CLIMATE ADAPTATION 
Climate adaptation involves making adjustments to the status quo in response to experienced or 
anticipated stresses to ecological, social and economic systems (Smit et al., 2000). Adaptive actions 
occur across scales and are taken in the context of institutional, regulatory, economic, corporate, 
technological and cultural drivers and barriers (Adger et al., 2005). Adaptation may be incremental – 
maintaining the essence and integrity of an existing system, or transformational – fundamentally 
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changing that system (Kates et al., 2012).  National and local government adaptation policies are 
important in framing the conditions for individuals to undertake adaptive action, as well as defining 
public adaptation work where individual action is insufficient (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change (IPCC), 2014; UNISDR, 2009). A key question for climate adaptation is how states, the private 
sector, communities and householders understand their roles and responsibilities for living with and 
adapting to risks imposed by other actants, including climatic events. 
For homeowners, adaptation to climate change often means mitigating the risk of extreme weather 
events, either proactively before a disaster strikes, or reactively after the property has been 
damaged. Adaptation could involve retrofitting their house with better drainage, more efficient 
heating and cooling systems, or ember-proofing to mitigate the risks of flood, heatwave or fire. 
Adaptation may also require householders to negotiate changes on land outside of their own 
property, for example where vegetation on land owned by others creates a fire hazard, where 
insufficient road drainage creates a flood risk, or where the construction of coastal defences leads to 
erosion further along the shore. Where risks become impossible to mitigate, such as in areas of 
dangerous coastal erosion, or where floods become annual events, adaptation may necessitate 
retreat without the option of reselling. Each of these adaptive actions involve understanding risk, 
evaluating what action is appropriate, financial commitments, regulatory considerations, and 
community support. None of these are straightforward, and all involve value judgements that are 
socially contingent, rather than technically calculable (Adger et al., 2005). Thus, the interdependent 
relationships between individuals and institutions (such as governments and insurers) are central to 
the effectiveness and equitability of climate adaptation (Adger, 2003). 
The idea of ‘shared responsibility’ for the impacts of extreme weather events is written into both 
disaster management and adaptation policies of liberal democracies across the globe (e.g. Box et al., 
2016; McLennan & Handmer, 2012). In a general sense, to have responsibility implies three things: 
an obligation in law or natural justice for which one may be held accountable; the ability or power 
with which to act; and also an expectation of care (Bickerstaff & Walker, 2002; Kent, 2012). In shared 
responsibility discourse, governments at multiple scales, community organisations, the private 
sector and individuals are each understood to have some degree of responsibility for preparing for 
and responding to climate-related disaster events. Shared responsibility is, in part, a reaction to top-
down approaches to disaster management, in which decisions were traditionally made by 
government agencies with minimal community consultation (Scolobig et al., 2015). It recognises that 
community capacity and engagement are vital to resilience and adaptation (Adger et al., 2011). 
Sharing responsibility for risk can be said to be adaptive, where it distributes risk across society, 
enabling individuals to act collectively, potentially giving legitimacy to adaptation decisions, and 
providing protection to vulnerable households (Adger 2003).  
In the context of the neoliberal shift toward individualisation and privatisation of responsibility for 
risk, reflecting the withdrawal of the welfare state, discourses of shared responsibility also invoke 
market-based self-responsibilisation approaches (N. Barnett, 2003). This includes the expectation by 
governments that households are responsible for adequately insuring against their own localised 
risks. Governments variously use regulations, subsidies, state-run insurance, public/private 
partnerships and education campaigns in order to encourage adequate levels of insurance cover. 
However, there is increasing emphasis on pure market models of insurance for natural disasters as 
the most efficient process of achieving adaptive behaviour (Lobo-Guerrero, 2010). 
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However, perceptions of how responsibility is shared often differ between householders, 
governments and insurers (Adger et al., 2013). For governments, householder ‘underinsurance’ (not 
being insured for the total value of all property), lack of cover for specific extreme weather events, 
and decisions not to insure are framed not only as moral failures, but also as evidence of irrationality 
– an incapacity to grasp the consequences of risks that are seen as distant and unlikely (Botzen & 
van den Bergh, 2009; Schwarze et al., 2011). In this framing, technocratic insurance instruments are 
objectively beneficial, and governments and insurers rational and benign. Governments and insurers 
therefore see their responsibility not as providing physical and financial protection against climatic 
risks, but ensuring sufficient information and risk-signalling to persuade householders to increase 
their private insurance cover. 
For householders, there is an affective dimension to their understanding of the ‘promise’ of 
insurance, or expectation of care, that is not present in market or regulatory logics (McFall, 2011). 
Fairness, solidarity, equitability, and protection of the vulnerable have been identified as 
fundamental to the social legitimacy of adaptation policy and action (Adger, 2016). Booth and 
Harwood (2016) found that for insured people living in an area of high wildfire risk, while the threat 
of fire was ever-present, the calculative logics of insurance technologies were distant and opaque. In 
contrast, the value of household belongings was emotionally constituted, and hence not everything 
within the home was deemed worthy of insuring. This disjunction contributed to uneasy trade-offs 
between the financial necessity of insurance when living in a dangerous area, and non-financial 
considerations. These included adherence to – or revolt against – the social norm of being insured, 
and the incommensurability of the monetary and affective value of possessions. Risk-awareness, as 
promoted by governments and insurers, has little bearing on decisions about insurance (Bubeck et 
al., 2012). 
Differences in understandings of the division of responsibility between insurers, government 
agencies and the insured can have multiple negative outcomes. In a Canadian study, Oulahen et al 
(2015) found that residents believed that governments should take primary responsibility for 
reducing the impact of natural hazards, while insurance companies were perceived to have lower 
levels of responsibility. In practice, insurers failed to meet even these community expectations. In 
studies where communities describe governments and insurers as failing to provide the protections 
they have promised, this perceived failure leads to feelings of helplessness that made individuals less 
likely to take adaptive action (Adger et al., 2013). Governments and insurers routinely fail to meet 
public expectations of their responsibilities when extreme weather events occur. For instance, 
Kammerbauer and Wamsler (2017) describe how disputes between insurers and government 
assessors after a flood event in Bavaria, Germany in 2013, led to a breakdown in responsibility 
sharing. Insured homeowners were unable to cover the cost of rebuilding, while governments 
funded the rebuilding of uninsured flooded property through disaster recovery spending.  
Insured people who have experienced disasters previously are less likely to believe that insurance is 
an adequate substitute for other forms of adaptation (Harries, 2012). While there is evidence that 
householders who are motivated to act themselves to take responsibility for mitigating, adapting 
and responding to extreme weather events are likely to be more resilient (Prior & Eriksen, 2012), the 
decision to purchase insurance may not contribute to this outcome. Indeed, studies in Australia and 
the UK have found that uninsured people often recover better, because they have built strong social 
networks in place of reliance on insurance (Keogh et al., 2011; Wamsler & Lawson, 2011). As O’Hare 
 9 
et al. (2016) observe, householders can be disempowered after a disaster event as insurers take 
control of properties and control repairs, and do not necessarily facilitate adaptive mitigation 
measures. This sits within the context of an already existing imbalance of power between the insurer 
and the insuree, with the latter carrying the moral burden of obligation when it comes to disclosure 
and accountability (Lobo-Guerrero, 2010, 2013). Such imbalances constitute a relationship of 
‘fatalistic dependency’ on behalf of householders, who in the absence of trust, still have little choice 
but to rely on their insurer to act ethically (Tranter & Booth, 2019). These examples underscore the 
importance of ethical considerations in climate adaptation policy. The social context, including place 
values (Agyeman et al., 2009), identity (Brown et al., 2019), agency and self-efficacy (Adger et al., 
2009), and capacity and networks (Scolobig et al., 2015) are vital elements of adaptation that are 
missing from technocratic and market-focussed policies.  
4. PROBLEMATIC PRIVATISATION OF CLIMATE ADAPTATION 
Governments in market-based economies have identified a pure market insurance model as the 
optimal arrangement for encouraging and financing climate adaptation at a household level. In 
addition to the example provided above from Australia, in the US, the longstanding National Flood 
Insurance Program (NFIP)ii was reformed in 2012 to eliminate subsidies and impose full risk-
reflective pricing (Knowles & Kunreuther, 2014).  Imposing risk-reflective pricing had an immediate 
negative effect on the prices of housing in high risk areas. Areas containing high proportions of poor 
people and racial minorities were disproportionately affected by the slump in property prices 
(Nance, 2015). Higher insurance prices relative to property value made it less likely that these 
houses would be insured, and the loss of capital made retrofitting untenable. A political backlash 
against these reforms led to them being dialled back in 2014, but the goal of the NFIP remains 
unsubsidised risk-reflective pricing. Under new arrangements, householders can expect their 
premiums to rise by up to 18 per cent a year, and subsidies are means-tested (Elliott, 2017). As Elliot 
(2017, p. 27) states: 
… the core presumptions [of the reformed NFIP] are that individuals are the source of risk and that 
greater individual responsibility on the part of those facing high risk, expressed as a form of market-
based financial decision making, will most effectively manage our relationship to catastrophe. 
In the UK, Flood Re, a not-for-profit insurance pool, was developed by the insurance industry and 
backed by government legislation, launching in 2016. It was created in response to the insurance 
industry finding itself unable to cover increasing flood risk, in a market context in which new insurers 
offered cheap insurance to low-risk customers, creating a problem of adverse selection (Penning-
Rowsell et al., 2014). Insurers of high flood risk households can cede cover for those households to 
Flood Re, at a discounted price. This is funded by a subsidy paid by all insurers, that is passed on to 
all policy-holders (Surminski, 2018). In this way, the whole pool of insured households continues to 
fund high risk households. Flood Re is described as a ‘cushion’ for high risk households, subsidising 
flood insurance in the short-term, but paving the way for fully risk-reflective pricing (Surminski, 
2018). However, it lacks any direct means of encouraging adaptive behaviour, or any process for 
transition to a pure market for flood insurance (Surminski & Eldridge, 2017). Christophers (2019) 
refers to Flood Re as an example of ‘the allusive market’: a stop-gap measure whose role is to 
generate the expectation of a pure market to follow. In doing so, it delimits the options for dealing 
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with flood risk to those relating to the pure market, and shuts out consideration of non-market 
solutions (Christophers, 2019).  
These kinds of approaches are part of neoliberal governmentality in which individuals are positioned 
as responsible for climate change and best-placed to meet risk challenges through personal, private-
sphere behaviour framed as consumer choices (Kent, 2009). There are significant drawbacks to this 
strategy. Fundamentally, the insurance industry is not primarily concerned with climate adaptation, 
but must balance the sometimes contradictory objectives of retaining social legitimacy, negotiating 
government regulation, and generating profit for shareholders. The private insurance sector has 
profitability as its primary mandate (Savitt, 2017), meaning that insurers cannot make losses from 
extreme weather events without recouping them from elsewhere. As McAneney et al. (2013) 
observe, in a purely market-based system, competition between private insurers can have unequal 
and inequitable consequences. To insure high risk properties, they must either price according to 
individualised measures of risk (risk-reflective pricing), cross-subsidise from other insured properties 
(mutualisation) or seek government subsidy. Where governments decline to subsidise, but also put 
pressure on insurers to make insurance universally available, a central problem for insurers is how to 
price risk to households fairly. To maintain consumer trust, the calculation of individual premiums 
must be seen to be legitimate. This is particularly important in pure private insurance models of 
climate adaptation. Where individuals can no longer expect protection by the state, the ability of 
households to have access to affordable insurance becomes vital to their ability to recover financially 
from extreme weather damage to their homes.  
Traditional, mutualised risk pools that distribute the cost of high-risk properties across the pool can 
be unfair. A number of studies point to examples of wealthy, insured residents choosing to live in 
attractive, but high-risk locations, being subsidized by other, less affluent policy-holders as a result of 
mutualised insurance pools (e.g. Oulahen et al., 2015; Roberts, 2013). Mutualisation in order to keep 
premiums low has also been blamed for encouraging housing development in high risk areas (Cutter 
et al., 2018). However, as the examples from the US and UK flood insurance have shown, insurers 
return to mutualisation when the politics of risk-reflective pricing become challenging.  
Insurers increasingly measure and price risk on an individualised basis, as technologies to measure 
and predict the localised behaviour of floodwater, storm surge, wind and fire become more widely 
available. Risk-reflective pricing can make insurance prohibitively expensive for people on middle to 
low incomes living in high risk areas (Penning-Rowsell & Pardoe, 2015). This can lead to the most 
vulnerable becoming the least insured (Duus-Otterström & Jagers, 2011). In some cases, 
vulnerability can become entrenched in ghettos of uninsurable housing in high risk areas (Gearing, 
2018; King et al., 2013). Johnson (2015) further suggests that the insurance industry uses large-scale 
extreme weather events as an opportunity to re-calibrate risk modelling and further increase 
premiums for high risk areas, leading to what she calls ‘splintering protectionism’ in which the 
property of the affluent is secured against loss, while the vulnerable are left to hope for ad hoc 
disaster relief by governments. Affordable or not, there is currently little empirical evidence to 
support the effectiveness of risk-reflective pricing as a risk signal (McAneney et al., 2013), or risk 
perception as a driver of insurance purchase (Bubeck et al., 2012). In fact, social norms and 
community expectations are more likely to lead to adaptive action than risk perceptions or economic 
factors (Lo, 2013a, 2013b). 
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Risk-reflective insurance pricing has become the ‘conventional wisdom’ for economists, as it 
conforms to a neoliberal imaginary of scientific rationalism and economic efficiency (Wright & 
Nyberg, 2014). As such, it fits easily with existing technocratic instruments of climate adaptation 
embedded in many institutions. Such instruments often assume economic rationalist modes of 
thinking that foreground respect for authority, stability and preservation of the status quo (Adger et 
al., 2017). One example is the UK Government’s adaptation policy, which has been criticised for its 
reliance on reductive scientific methodologies for the assessment of climate risk (Howarth et al., 
2018). The normalisation and normatisation of risk-reflective pricing conceals assumptions about 
market responses to risk as the natural solution to climate problems, and masks the political agenda 
of insurance as the preferred mechanism for climate adaptation (Weinkle, 2019).  
The rise of home insurance as the predominant form of protection against extreme weather events 
and other natural disasters is a consequence of decisions by neoliberal governments to step back 
from responsibility for disaster management as a duty of the state, transferring the financial burden 
from taxation to private insurance of financialised individuals (Johnson, 2013). It casts adaptive 
action as a consumer, rather than a citizen behaviour, shifting the focus of responsibility for climate 
action from citizen/state to consumer/market (O’Hare et al., 2016). By placing total responsibility for 
the risk on the homeowner, it negates the responsibility for increased climate risk borne by 
corporate emitters of greenhouse gases, and the responsibility of governments for fair regulation of 
and protection from these impacts (Cuomo, 2011). Insurance sustains the status quo, both literally 
by returning buildings to their original state, and discursively, by enshrining free market solutions as 
the answer to climate change (O’Hare et al., 2016). As Wright and Nyberg (2014, p. 10) put it: 
“market-based solutions [to climate change] suggest that any unintended consequences will be dealt 
with as ‘market failures’, not as a failure of the ‘market society’.”  
It is important to note the “creeping privatisation of social welfare” (French & Kneale, 2009, p. 1030) 
which is a political and ideological move, rather than a natural, or common sense process. The 
means through which climate adaptation is becoming privatised in countries such as the US, UK and 
Australia are obscured through the technologies of market insurance, and the close relationships of 
insurers to governments. As Penning-Rowsell et al. (2014, p. 695) point out, study of insurance is 
methodologically problematic, in part because ”‘commercial sensitivities’ – real or invented – 
surround the insurance industry.” Fundamentally, reliance on private insurance narrows the field of 
options for adapting to climate change. The dangers of this are clearly described by Millward-
Hopkins (2016, p. 15): 
On this path, self- interest, technocratic governmentality, and techno- logical solutions overshadow 
collective action and voices challenging fundamental contradictions between low-carbon transitions 
and growth-reliant consumer society. Consequently, an illusion emerges that there are limits to 
society’s capacity for adaptation, when in reality such limits are culturally and ideologically 
contingent. 
Is private insurance necessary for climate adaptation? While there is a global trend toward pure 
market approaches, some countries eschew private insurance for extreme weather events, and 
maintain an approach grounded in welfare and solidarity. In Belgium, France, Italy, Spain, and the 
Netherlands, government compensation for disaster impacts is still seen as a fundamental right of 
individuals (Monti, 2009). International funds such as the Green Climate Fund set up under the 
UNFCCC support climate adaptation in developing countries (Hulme et al., 2012). International 
 12 
funds, such as the EU Solidarity Fund that was established after major flooding across Europe in 
2002, are also an opportunity for financing adaptation (Aakre et al., 2010). In countries with large 
Muslim populations, alternative forms of not-for-profit household insurance that conform to Islamic 
prohibitions of usury, focus on solidarity, rather than individualised risk. ‘Takaful’, from the Arabic 
word ‘kafal’ meaning to take care of one another’s needs (Swartz & Coetzer, 2010) is understood as 
an insurance instrument that works for the benefit of a social group, rather than a contract between 
an individual and an insurance company (Baker, 2002).  
5. CONCLUSION 
The complex and multi-scalar interaction of human and non-human actants involved in climate 
change mean that it is often hard to evaluate the success of actions, which can prove adaptive in one 
context and maladaptive in another. Maladaptive actions, while aiming to reduce vulnerability to 
climate change, “impact adversely on, or increase… the vulnerability of other systems, sectors or 
social groups.” (J. Barnett & O’Neill, 2010, p. 211) Maladaptations may place disproportionate 
burden on the most vulnerable in society, reduce incentives to adapt, or reduce future opportunities 
to adapt, for instance by creating path dependency. Whether an action is evaluated as adaptive or 
maladaptive is therefore highly subjective, dependent on the positionality and values of those 
involved and affected by it (Adger et al., 2005). For this reason, it is important to include the 
perspectives and experiences of a wide range of stakeholders in evaluating the suitability of policy 
framings for adaptation. Studies increasingly advocate a co-production approach to adaptation as a 
way of valuing lay knowledge, and including public participation in climate governance (Howarth et 
al., 2018; Sarzynski, 2015; Wamsler, 2016).  
The growth of pure market insurance is an example of an approach that, while considered adaptive 
by many governments, can be seen as maladaptive in its effect on vulnerable communities, and its 
emphasis on individualising risk at the cost of collective action. Pure market approaches to 
adaptation may be financially efficient and actuarily sound, and thus considered apt based on a 
narrow range of criteria, but appear incommensurable with the principles of fairness, solidarity, 
equitability, and protection of the vulnerable that have been identified as essential in the social 
science literature on climate adaptation (Adger, 2016). On the contrary, pure market insurance 
models of climate adaptation leave the most vulnerable and those at highest risk of extreme 
weather events unprotected, by refusing them insurance even as risk-reflective premiums reduce 
the value of their property. This is not to say that people living in places of high risk should be 
subsidised to stay there. Rather, that market approaches individualise risk where collective and 
solidaristic responses may be more appropriate and effective. Framing insurance as the best means 
of climate adaptation privileges technocratic and economic rationalist ways of being and knowing, 
while devaluing lay knowledge, the importance of community and non-financial forms of adaptation. 
As Adger et al. (2017, p. 373) observe, “economic rationality is limited in its ability to produce 
optimal environmental outcomes, even in the circumstances of perfect markets and perfect 
information.”  
There are many reasons to assume that a pure market approach is unlikely to generate good 
outcomes for climate adaptation environmentally or socially. Existing insurance markets and 
available information for adaptation are both far from perfect (Stern, 2006). Underinsurance and 
insurance unavailability or unaffordability are widespread, and trust in insurers is low (Tranter & 
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Booth, 2019). Localised effects of climate change are complex, and adaptation action is often the 
subject of political disagreement, so reliance on private interests may not lead to fair or legitimate 
outcomes (Adger et al., 2012). Risk-reflective pricing is limited in its effectiveness as an incentive to 
adapt because social values, rather than economic values, are more likely to affect people’s 
willingness to act on climate change (Evans et al., 2012; Lucas, 2018). Without reference to social 
values and context, technocratic forms of risk measurement and calculation make trade-offs based 
on limited information. For example, loss of biodiversity or cultural heritage is not offset by 
economic gains, as these sets of values are incommensurable (Adger, 2016). Fundamentally, 
successful adaptation hinges on our capacity to work together as a society, and dependence on 
individualised insurance limits that capacity. 
Lehtonen and Liukko (2011) argue that aspects of solidarity and mutual dependency also exist within 
the private insurance industry, but have become hidden as the sector has become increasingly 
complex and technologised. While examples such as Takaful, or solidarity funds offer alternative 
models for insurance and climate adaptation, the proactive approach to climate change being taken 
by insurers in western democracies including the US, UK and Australia is placing the insurance sector 
front and centre, while governments step back through individual responsibilisation agendas. 
Insurance is increasingly the adaptation mechanism of choice for governments, and the insurance 
sector, it could be argued, is emerging as the leader in relation to climate risk. These changes reflect 
a redistribution of power within market-based economies that warrants further attention, 
particularly in light of the power imbalances evident in relation to insurance.  
 
 
Figures and Tables 







This study was funded by the Australian Research Council Discovery Project 'Geographies of house 
and contents under-insurance' (DP170100096) 
 
References 
Aakre, S., Banaszak, I., Mechler, R., Rübbelke, D., Wreford, A., & Kalirai, H. (2010). Financial 
adaptation to disaster risk in the European Union: Identifying roles for the public sector. 
Mitigation and Adaptation Strategies for Global Change, 15(7), 721–736. 
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11027-010-9232-3 
Adger, W. N. (2003). Social Capital, Collective Action, and Adaptation to Climate Change. Economic 
Geography, 79(4), 387–404. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1944-8287.2003.tb00220.x 
Adger, W. N. (2016). Place, well-being, and fairness shape priorities for adaptation to climate 
change. Global Environmental Change, 38, A1–A3. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2016.03.009 
Adger, W. N., Arnell, N. W., Tompkins, E. L., Carmin, J., Tierney, K., Chu, E., Hunter, L. M., Roberts, J. 
T., Shi, L., Eisenack, K., Stecker, R., Eriksen, S. H., Nightingale, A. J., Eakin, H. C., Ford, J. D., 
Berrang-Ford, L., Paterson, J., Füssel, H.-M., Bassett, T. J., … Harmon, S. P. (2005). Successful 
adaptation to climate change across scales. Global Environmental Change, 15, 77–86. 
 15 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2004.12.005 
Adger, W. N., Barnett, J., Brown, K., Marshall, N., & O’Brien, K. (2012). Cultural dimensions of climate 
change impacts and adaptation. Nature Publishing Group, 3(2), 112–117. 
https://doi.org/10.1038/nclimate1666 
Adger, W. N., Brown, K., Nelson, D. R., Berkes, F., Eakin, H., Folke, C., Galvin, K., Gunderson, L., 
Goulden, M., O’Brien, K., Ruitenbeek, J., & Tompkins, E. L. (2011). Resilience implications of 
policy responses to climate change. Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews: Climate Change, 2(5), 757–
766. https://doi.org/10.1002/wcc.133 
Adger, W. N., Butler, C., & Walker-Springett, K. (2017). Moral reasoning in adaptation to climate 
change. Environmental Politics, 26(3), 371–390. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/09644016.2017.1287624 
Adger, W. N., Dessai, S., Goulden, M., Hulme, M., Lorenzoni, I., Nelson, D. R., Naess, L. O., Wolf, J., & 
Wreford, A. (2009). Are there social limits to adaptation to climate change? Climatic Change, 
93(3–4), 335–354. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10584-008-9520-z 
Adger, W. N., Quinn, T., Lorenzoni, I., Murphy, C., & Sweeney, J. (2013). Changing social contracts in 
climate-change adaptation. Nature Climate Change, 3(4), 330–333. 
https://doi.org/10.1038/nclimate1751 
Agyeman, J., Devine-Wright, P., & Prange, J. (2009). Close to the edge, down by the river? Joining up 
managed retreat and place attachment in a climate changed world. Environment and Planning 
A, 41(3), 509–513. https://doi.org/10.1068/a41301 
Australian Competition and Consumer Commission. (2019). Northern Australia Insurance Inquiry 
Second Update Report (Issue July). 
Australian Government. (2015). Northern Australia Insurance Premiums Taskforce Final Report. 
Australian Government The Treasury. (2018). Natural Disaster Insurance: Background Paper 20. In 
Royal Commission into Misconduct in the Banking, Superannuation and Financial Services 
Industry. 
Baker, T. (2002). Risk, Insurance, and (the Social Construction of) Responsibility. University of 
Connecticut School of Law Articles and Working Papers. 
Banhalmi-Zakar, Z., Ware, D., Edwards, I., Kelly, K., Becken, S., & Cox, R. (2016). Mechanisms to 
finance climate change adaptation in Australia. In National Climate Change Adaptation 
Research Facility 2016 (Issue October). 
Barnett, J., & O’Neill, S. (2010). Maladaptation. Global Environmental Change, 20(2), 211–213. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2009.11.004 
Barnett, N. (2003). Local government, New Labour and ‘Active Welfare’: A Case of ‘Self 
Responsibilisation’? Public Policy and Administration, 18(3), 25–38. 
https://doi.org/10.1177/095207670301800303 
Bauman, Z. (2008). Happiness in a society of individuals. Soundings, 38, 19–28. 
Beck, U. (1992). Risk Society: Towards a New Modernity. Sage. https://doi.org/10.2307/2579937 
Bell, J. (2011). Insurance for Extreme Weather Events in Australia - Current Policy Trends, and Future 
Directions. 1(1), 3–5. https://doi.org/10.1097/ANS.0000000000000109 
 16 
Ben-Shahar, O., & Logue, K. D. (2015). The Perverse Effects of Subsidized Weather Insurance. 
Stanford Law Review, 68(March), 571–626. https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2549320 
Bickerstaff, K., & Walker, G. (2002). Risk, responsibility, and blame: An analysis of vocabularies of 
motive in air-pollution(ing) discourses. Environment and Planning A, 34(12), 2175–2192. 
https://doi.org/10.1068/a3521 
Botzen, W. J. W., & van den Bergh, J. C. J. M. (2009). Bounded rationality, climate risks, and 
insurance: Is there a market for natural disasters? Land Economics, 85(2), 265–278. 
https://doi.org/10.3368/le.85.2.265 
Box, P., Bird, D., Haynes, K., & King, D. (2016). Shared responsibility and social vulnerability in the 
2011 Brisbane flood. Natural Hazards, 81(3), 1549–1568. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11069-016-
2145-z 
Brown, K., Adger, W. N., Devine-wright, P., Anderies, J. M., Barr, S., Bousquet, F., Butler, C., Evans, L., 
Marshall, N., & Quinn, T. (2019). Empathy , place and identity interactions for sustainability. 
Global Environmental Change, 56(December 2018), 11–17. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2019.03.003 
Bubeck, P., Botzen, W. J. W., & Aerts, J. C. J. H. (2012). A Review of Risk Perceptions and Other 
Factors that Influence Flood Mitigation Behavior. Risk Analysis, 32(9), 1481–1495. 
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1539-6924.2011.01783.x 
Butler, C., & Pidgeon, N. (2011). From “flood defence” to “flood risk management”: Exploring 
governance, responsibility, and blame. Environment and Planning C: Government and Policy, 
29(3), 533–547. https://doi.org/10.1068/c09181j 
Christophers, B. (2019). The allusive market: insurance of flood risk in neoliberal Britain. Economy 
and Society, 48(1), 1–29. https://doi.org/10.1080/03085147.2018.1547494 
CRO Forum. (2019). The heat is on Insurability and Resilience in a Changing Climate Emerging Risk 
Initiative-Position Paper. 52. 
Cuomo, C. J. (2011). Climate Change, Vulnerability, and Responsibility. Hypatia, 26(4), 1–25. 
Cutter, S. L., Emrich, C. T., Gall, M., & Reeves, R. (2018). Flash Flood Risk and the Paradox of Urban 
Development. Natural Hazards Review, 19(1), 05017005. 
https://doi.org/10.1061/(ASCE)NH.1527-6996.0000268 
de Vet, E., & Eriksen, C. (2019). When insurance and goodwill are not enough: Bushfire Attack Level 
(BAL) ratings, risk calculations and disaster resilience in Australia. Australian Geographer, 0(0), 
1–17. https://doi.org/10.1080/00049182.2019.1691436 
de Vet, E., Eriksen, C., Booth, K., & French, S. (2019). An Unmitigated Disaster: Shifting from 
Response and Recovery to Mitigation for an Insurable Future. International Journal of Disaster 
Risk Science, July 2018. https://doi.org/10.1007/s13753-019-0214-0 
Duus-Otterström, G., & Jagers, S. C. (2011). Why (most) climate insurance schemes are a bad idea. 
Environmental Politics, 20(3), 322–339. https://doi.org/10.1080/09644016.2011.573354 
Elliott, R. (2017). Who pays for the next wave? The American welfare state and responsibility for 
flood risk. Politics and Society, 45(3), 415–440. https://doi.org/10.1177/0032329217714785 
European Commission. (2018). Using insurance in adaptation to climate change. 
 17 
https://doi.org/10.2834/745494 
Evans, L. L. H., Maio, G. R., Corner, A. J., Hodgetts, C. J., Ahmed, S., & Hahn, U. (2012). Self-interest 
and pro-environmental behaviour. Nature Climate Change, 3(2), 122–125. 
https://doi.org/10.1038/nclimate1662 
Ewald, F. (1991). Insurance and Risk. In G. Burchell, C. Gordon, & P. Miller (Eds.), The Foucault Effect: 
Studies in Governmentality (pp. 197–210). Harvester Wheatsheaf. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/S0006-3495(02)75469-6 
Fels, A., & Cousins, D. (2019). Submission to NSW Treasury Discussion Paper - Disclosure in General 
Insurance: Improving Consumer Understanding. February. 
French, S., & Kneale, J. (2009). Excessive financialisation: Insuring lifestyles, enlivening subjects, and 
everyday spaces of biosocial excess. Environment and Planning D: Society and Space, 27(6), 
1030–1053. https://doi.org/10.1068/d7607 
Gearing, A. (2018). Post-disaster recovery is a marathon, not a sprint. Pacific Journalism Review : Te 
Koakoa, 24(1), 52–68. https://doi.org/10.24135/pjr.v24i1.402 
Geneva Association. (2018). Climate Change and the Insurance Industry: Taking Action as Risk 
Managers and Investors. 1–48. 
Giddens, A. (1990). The Consequences of Modernity. Polity Press. https://doi.org/10.2307/591454 
Giddens, A. (1991). Modernity and Self Identity. Polity Press. 
Harries, T. (2012). The anticipated emotional consequences of adaptive behaviour - impacts on the 
take-up of household flood-protection measures. Environment and Planning A, 44(3), 649–668. 
https://doi.org/10.1068/a43612 
Harwood, J., Smith, D. J., & Henderson, D. (2016). Building community cyclone resilience through 
academic and insurance industry partnership. Australian Journal of Emergency Management, 
31(4), 24–30. 
Highfield, W. E., Norman, S. A., & Brody, S. D. (2013). Examining the 100-Year Floodplain as a Metric 
of Risk, Loss, and Household Adjustment. Risk Analysis, 33(2), 186–191. 
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1539-6924.2012.01840.x 
Howarth, C., Morse-Jones, S., Brooks, K., & Kythreotis, A. P. (2018). Co-producing UK climate change 
adaptation policy: An analysis of the 2012 and 2017 UK Climate Change Risk Assessments. 
Environmental Science and Policy, 89(July), 412–420. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.envsci.2018.09.010 
Hudson, P., Botzen, W. J. W., Feyen, L., & Aerts, J. C. J. H. (2016). Incentivising flood risk adaptation 
through risk based insurance premiums: Trade-offs between affordability and risk reduction. 
Ecological Economics, 125, 1–13. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ecolecon.2016.01.015 
Hulme, M., Neill, S. J. O., & Dessai, S. (2012). Is Weather Event Attribution Necessary for Adaptation 
Funding ? Science, 334(November 2011), 764–766. https://doi.org/10.1126/science.1211740 
Institute of Actuaries of Australia. (2011). Submission to the Productivity Commission Barriers to 
Effective Climate Change Adaption Public inquiry. 
Insurance Council of Australia. (2014). Submission to the Productivity Commision Review of Natural 
Disaster Funding Arrangements. 
 18 
Insurance Council of Australia. (2019). Statement on the 2019-2020 Federal Budget. 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). (2014). AR5 Climate Change 2014: Impacts, 
Adaptation, and Vulnerability. 
Johnson, L. (2013). Index insurance and the articulation of risk-bearing subjects. Environment and 
Planning A, 45(11), 2663–2681. https://doi.org/10.1068/a45695 
Johnson, L. (2015). Catastrophic fixes: cyclical devaluation and accumulation through climate change 
impacts. Environment and Planning A, 47(12), 2503–2521. 
https://doi.org/10.1177/0308518X15594800 
Kammerbauer, M., & Wamsler, C. (2017). Social inequality and marginalization in post-disaster 
recovery: Challenging the consensus? International Journal of Disaster Risk Reduction, 
24(November 2016), 411–418. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijdrr.2017.06.019 
Kates, R. W., Travis, W. R., & Wilbanks, T. J. (2012). Transformational adaptation when incremental 
adaptations to climate change are insufficient. Proceedings of the National Academy of 
Sciences of the United States of America, 109(19), 7156–7161. 
https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1115521109 
Kent, J. (2009). Individualized responsibility and climate change: ‘if climate protection becomes 
everyone’s responsibility, does it end up being no-one’s?’ Cosmopolitan Civil Societies Journal, 
1(3), 132–149. 
Kent, J. (2012). Climate Change - whose responsibility? From the personal to the global. Doctoral 
Thesis, University of Technology Sydney. 
Keogh, D. U., Apan, A., Mushtaq, S., King, D., & Thomas, M. (2011). Resilience, vulnerability and 
adaptive capacity of an inland rural town prone to flooding: A climate change adaptation case 
study of Charleville, Queensland, Australia. Natural Hazards, 59(2), 699–723. 
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11069-011-9791-y 
King, D., Ginger, J., William, S., Cottrell, A., Gurtner, Y., Leitch, C., Henderson, D., Jayasinge, N., Kim, 
P., Booth, K., Ewin, C., Innes, K., Jacobs, K., Jago-Bassingthwaighte, M., & Jackson, L. (2013). 
Planning, building and insuring: Adaptation of built environment to climate change induced 
increased intensity of natural hazards. National Climate Change Adaptation and Research 
Facility and James Cook University. 
Knowles, S. G., & Kunreuther, H. C. (2014). Troubled waters: The national flood insurance program in 
historical perspective. Journal of Policy History, 26(3), 327–353. 
https://doi.org/10.1017/S0898030614000153 
Konrad, K. A., & Thum, M. (2012). The role of economic policy in climate change adaptation. EIB 
Working Papers, European Investment Bank, 2012(02). 
Kousky, C. (2018). Financing Flood Losses: A Discussion of the National Flood Insurance Program. 
Risk Management and Insurance Review, 21(1), 11–32. https://doi.org/10.1111/rmir.12090 
Leatherman, S. P. (2018). Coastal Erosion and the United States National Flood Insurance Program. 
Ocean and Coastal Management, 156, 35–42. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ocecoaman.2017.04.004 
Lehtonen, T. K. (2017). Objectifying Climate Change: Weather-Related Catastrophes as Risks and 
Opportunities for Reinsurance. Political Theory, 45(1), 32–51. 
 19 
https://doi.org/10.1177/0090591716680684 
Lehtonen, T. K., & Liukko, J. (2011). The Forms and Limits of Insurance Solidarity. Journal of Business 
Ethics, 103(SUPPL.1), 33–44. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10551-012-1221-x 
Lo, A. Y. (2013a). The likelihood of having flood insurance increases with social expectations. Area, 
45(1), 70–76. https://doi.org/10.1111/area.12002 
Lo, A. Y. (2013b). The role of social norms in climate adaptation: Mediating risk perception and flood 
insurance purchase. Global Environmental Change, 23(5), 1249–1257. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2013.07.019 
Lobo-Guerrero, L. (2010). Insurance, climate change, and the creation of geographies of uncertainty 
in the Indian Ocean Region. Journal of the Indian Ocean Region, 6(2), 239–251. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/19480881.2010.536671 
Lobo-Guerrero, L. (2013). Uberrima Fides, Foucault and the Security of Uncertainty. International 
Journal for the Semiotics of Law, 26(1), 23–37. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11196-012-9267-8 
Lucas, C. H. (2018). Concerning values: What underlies public polarisation about climate change? 
Geographical Research, 56(3), 298–310. 
Mason, A. (2011). The History of Flood Insurance in Australia. In Paper commissioned for the 
National Disaster Insurance Review. 
Maurer, B. (1999). Forget Locke? From Proprietor to Risk-Bearer in New Logics of Finance. Public 
Culture, 11(2), 365–385. https://doi.org/10.1215/08992363-11-2-365 
McAneney, J., Crompton, R., McAneney, D., Musulin, R., Walker, G., & Pielke Jr, R. (2013). Market-
based mechanisms for climate change adaptation: Assessing the potential for and limits to 
insurance and market based mechanisms for encouraging climate change adaptation. National 
Climate Change Adaptation Research Facility. 
McAneney, J., McAneney, D., Musulin, R., Walker, G., & Crompton, R. (2016). Government-
sponsored natural disaster insurance pools: A view from down-under. International Journal of 
Disaster Risk Reduction, 15, 1–9. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijdrr.2015.11.004 
McDonald, J. (2014). A Short History of Climate Adaptation Law in Australia. Climate Law, 1, 150–
167. https://doi.org/10.1163/18786561-00402013 
McFall, L. (2011). A “good, average man”: calculation and the limits of statistics in enrolling 
insurance customers. Sociological Review, 59(4), 661–684. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-
954X.2011.02033.x 
McLennan, B. J., & Handmer, J. (2012). Reframing responsibility-sharing for bushfire risk 
management in Australia after Black Saturday. Environmental Hazards, 11(1), 1–15. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/17477891.2011.608835 
Millward-Hopkins, J. T. (2016). Natural capital, unnatural markets? Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews: 
Climate Change, 7(1), 13–22. https://doi.org/10.1002/wcc.370 
Monti, A. (2009). Climate Cange and Weather-related Disasters: What Role For Insurance, 
Reinsurance and Financial Sectors? Hastings Environmental Law Journal, 15(1), 151–172. 
Nance, E. (2015). Exploring the impacts of flood insurance reform on vulnerable communities. 
International Journal of Disaster Risk Reduction, 13, 20–36. 
 20 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijdrr.2015.03.001 
National Working Group on Financial Risk of Flooding. (2019). Options for Managing Flood Costs of 
Canada’s Highest Risk Residential Properties. Insurance Bureau of Canada, June. 
Norgaard, K. M. (2017). The sociological imagination in a time of climate change. Global and 
Planetary Change. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.gloplacha.2017.09.018 
O’Hare, P., White, I., & Connelly, A. (2016). Insurance as maladaptation: Resilience and the ‘business 
as usual’ paradox. Environment and Planning C: Government and Policy, 34(6), 1175–1193. 
https://doi.org/10.1177/0263774X15602022 
Oulahen, G., Shrubsole, D., & McBean, G. (2015). Determinants of residential vulnerability to flood 
hazards in Metro Vancouver, Canada. Natural Hazards, 78(2), 939–956. 
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11069-015-1751-5 
Penning-Rowsell, E. C., & Pardoe, J. (2015). The distributional consequences of future flood risk 
management in England and Wales. Environment and Planning C: Government and Policy, 
33(5), 1301–1321. https://doi.org/10.1177/0263774X15612345 
Penning-Rowsell, E. C., Priest, S., & Johnson, C. (2014). The evolution of UK flood insurance: 
incremental change over six decades. International Journal of Water Resources Development, 
30(4), 694–713. https://doi.org/10.1080/07900627.2014.903166 
Prior, T., & Eriksen, C. (2012). Connecting community cohesion, social-ecological systems and 
wildfire resilience. Global Environmental Change. 
Productivity Commission. (2014). Natural Disaster Funding Arrangements: Productivity Commission 
Inquiry Report (Vol. 1, Issue 74). Commonwealth of Australia. 
Rees, R., & Wambach, A. (2008). The microeconomics of insurance. Foundations and Trends in 
Microeconomics, 4(1–2), 1–163. https://doi.org/10.1561/0700000023 
Roberts, J. (2013). “What Are We Protecting Out Here?” A Political Ecology of Forest, Fire, and Fuels 
Management in Utah’s Wildland-Urban Interface. Capitalism Nature Socialism, 24(2), 58–76. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/10455752.2013.784528 
Roche, K. M., John McAneney, K., & Van Den Honert, R. C. (2010). Policy options for managing flood 
insurance. Environmental Hazards, 9(4), 369–378. https://doi.org/10.3763/ehaz.2010.0001 
Sarzynski, A. (2015). Public participation, civic capacity, and climate change adaptation in cities. 
Urban Climate, 14, 52–67. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.uclim.2015.08.002 
Savitt, A. (2017). Insurance as a tool for hazard risk management? An evaluation of the literature. 
Natural Hazards, 86(2), 583–599. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11069-016-2706-1 
Schwarze, R., Schwindt, M., Weck-Hannemann, H., Raschky, P., Zahn, F., & Wagner, G. G. (2011). 
Natural hazard insurance in Europe: Tailored responses to climate change are needed. 
Environmental Policy and Governance, 21(1), 14–30. https://doi.org/10.1002/eet.554 
Scolobig, A., Prior, T., Schröter, D., Jörin, J., & Patt, A. (2015). Towards people-centred approaches 
for effective disaster risk management: Balancing rhetoric with reality. International Journal of 
Disaster Risk Reduction, 12, 202–212. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijdrr.2015.01.006 
Shively, D. (2017). Flood risk management in the USA: implications of National Flood Insurance 
Program changes for social justice. Regional Environmental Change, 17(6), 1663–1672. 
 21 
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10113-017-1228-z 
Shove, E. (2010). Beyond the ABC: climate change policy and theories of social change. Environment 
and Planning A, 42(6), 1273–1285. https://doi.org/10.1068/a42282 
Smit, B., Burton, I., Klein, R., & Wandel, J. (2000). An anatomy of adaptation to climate change and 
vulnerability. Climatic Change, 45, 223–251. 
Steffen, W., Dean, A., & Rice, M. (2019). Weather gone wild: Climate change-fuelled extreme 
weather in 2018. 
Stern, N. (2006). Stern Review: The Economics of Climate Change. London School of Economics. 
https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.98.2.1 
Steuer, M. (Munich R. (2015). Australia on fire. 
Stott, P. A., Christidis, N., Otto, F. E. L., Sun, Y., Vanderlinden, J. P., van Oldenborgh, G. J., Vautard, R., 
von Storch, H., Walton, P., Yiou, P., & Zwiers, F. W. (2016). Attribution of extreme weather and 
climate-related events. Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews: Climate Change, 7(1), 23–41. 
https://doi.org/10.1002/wcc.380 
Surminski, S. (2018). Fit for Purpose and Fit for the Future? An Evaluation of the UK’s New Flood 
Reinsurance Pool. Risk Management and Insurance Review, 21(1), 33–72. 
https://doi.org/10.1111/rmir.12093 
Surminski, S., & Eldridge, J. (2017). Flood insurance in England – an assessment of the current and 
newly proposed insurance scheme in the context of rising flood risk. Journal of Flood Risk 
Management, 10(4), 415–435. https://doi.org/10.1111/jfr3.12127 
Swartz, N., & Coetzer, P. (2010). Takaful: An Islamic Insurance Instrument. Journal of Development 
and Agricultural Economics, 2(10), 333–339. 
Tranter, B., & Booth, K. (2019). Geographies of trust: Socio-spatial variegations of trust in insurance. 
Geoforum, July, 0–1. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geoforum.2019.07.006 
Trowbridge, J., Minto, J., & Berrill, J. (2011). Natural Disaster Insurance Review. 
UNISDR. (2009). Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015-2030. 
https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199560103.003.0005 
Wamsler, C. (2016). From Risk Governance to City–Citizen Collaboration: Capitalizing on individual 
adaptation to climate change. Environmental Policy and Governance, 26(3), 184–204. 
https://doi.org/10.1002/eet.1707 
Wamsler, C., & Lawson, N. (2011). The role of formal and informal insurance mechanisms for 
reducing urban disaster risk: A South-North comparison. Housing Studies, 26(2), 197–223. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/02673037.2011.542087 
Weinkle, J. (2019). Experts, regulatory capture, and the “governor’s dilemma”: The politics of 
hurricane risk science and insurance. Regulation and Governance, March. 
https://doi.org/10.1111/rego.12255 
Wright, C., & Nyberg, D. (2014). Creative self-destruction: corporate responses to climate change as 








i At the time of writing, Australia is in the midst of a bushfire crisis that has burned over 10 million 
hectares, destroying more than 2700 homes. Bushfire (known internationally as wildfire), more than 
any other form of climatic disaster, is likely to lead to total loss of property, rather than repairable 
damage (Steuer, 2015). This makes the effect of underinsurance greater, as many people who lose 
their homes find that their insurance will not cover the cost of rebuilding. In the Black Saturday 
bushfires of 2009, in which around 2000 homes were destroyed, it was estimated that 80 per cent of 
those affected who were insured did not have adequate insurance. A further 13 per cent of 
properties destroyed were not insured at all (Steuer, 2015). Since 2009, Australia has changed 
building standards for properties in bushfire risk areas, to adapt to this risk. However, compliance 
with these adaptive standards is expensive, and not included in standard insurance policies (de Vet 
& Eriksen, 2019).  
ii The NFIP was instigated in 1968, as a hybrid private/public insurance scheme the stated aim of 
which was to make flood insurance affordable, giving security and dignity to those impacted by 
flooding (Elliott, 2017). It was designed to: (a) subsidise insurance premiums in order to shift the 
majority of disaster relief funding away from reactive post-disaster arrangements; (b) to encourage 
adaptation by communities to mitigate risks; and (c) to limit development in high risk areas (for 
reviews of the NFIP see Kousky, 2018; Shively, 2017). By opting into the program, municipalities 
must commit to mitigation measures and limits to development. Within these areas, all 
homeowners judged to have a one per cent or greater annual chance of flooding, who have 
federally-backed mortgages, must purchase NFIP policies. However, in practice the NFIP has failed to 
live up to its goals, and has been criticised of enabling, rather than limiting, risky development 
(Cutter et al., 2018). Risk mapping that delineates which communities are eligible, and at what 
premium price, has also been widely criticised as inadequate (eg. Highfield et al., 2013; Leatherman, 
2018).  
 
